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Key Point 
In an earlier note, I discussed how a Greek parallel currency to the euro could allow the Greek 
government to gain some room for manoeuver in fiscal policy while at the same time continuing the 
adjustment programme demanded by the country’s creditors. In this Commentary, I explore the 
question of how the Greek population could still keep the euro after a default of its government. 
Contrary to general belief, Grexit and the reintroduction of the euro as a foreign currency would 
probably be positive for the Greek economy. Creditors, however, would be hard hit. It is therefore 
primarily in their interest that default and Grexit are avoided.  
A default against official creditors only 
A key assumption in my proposal for a Greek parallel currency to the euro, published in a 
CEPS paper last month,1 was that the Greek government would reach an agreement with its 
creditors in order to avoid a default. In the meantime, however, the options have narrowed: 
Either the creditors further water down their conditions for financial assistance to an extent 
that allows the Greek government to sign on to additional help without changing its 
position, or both sides stick to their positions and Greece will run out of money to make 
upcoming debt repayments. In this note, I assume the latter will happen. 
In the intermediate future, sizeable debt repayments are due only to the International 
Monetary Fund and the European Central Bank. Debt servicing of the rescheduled private 
debt is moderate in the near-term, and repayments to the European Stability Mechanism do 
not begin before the end of this decade. Representatives of rating agencies have pointed out 
that it is not clear whether a default against the IMF and the ECB would lead to a default 
rating on Greek market debt. As long as Greece avoids default against the debt held by the 
private sector, it may escape a default rating and hence keep market access open for the 
future. This possibility lowers the costs of defaulting against the official creditors and makes 
default therefore more likely. However, escaping a default rating is not of material 
importance for the consequences of a default against the ‘institutions’ (the new label for the 
European Commission, the ECB and the IMF), which is discussed below. 
                                                     
1 See T. Mayer, “A Parallel Currency for Greece“, CEPS High-Level Brief, CEPS, Brussels, 20 May 2015 
(www.ceps.eu/publications/parallel-currency-greece). 
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Separating the Greek banking sector into a ‘good’ and a ‘bad’ bank 
At the end of April, the size of the balance sheet of the Greek banking sector (monetary 
financial institutions) amounted to €315 billion. On the liability side, Greek banks owed €113 
billion to the Bank of Greece. This sum included ordinary credit as well as Emergency 
Lending Assistance (recently raised to €84 billion). Deposits and liabilities under repurchase 
agreements amounted to €175 billion. Capital and reserves totalled up to €70 billion, with €52 
billion being share capital (presumably including deferred tax credits against the 
government). On the asset side, Greek banks held loans to the Greek government in the 
amount of €9.5 billion and Greek government bonds of €13.6 billion (hence total claims on 
government of some €23 billion). Loans to the private sector amounted to €211 billion. The 
remaining assets included among other things debt securities and shares issued by 
borrowers in other countries. Table A1 in the Appendix gives a stylised balance sheet of the 
Greek banking sector. 
Should the Greek government decide to default against its official creditors, banks’ balance 
sheets would in a first step have to be temporarily frozen by introducing capital controls and 
restrictions to cash withdrawals from sight deposits. In a second step, however, it could 
restructure the banking sector into a ‘good bank’, which would retain the euro, and a ‘bad 
bank’, which would wind down non-performing assets against haircuts of liabilities of the 
bad bank to the Bank of Greece. Based on unofficial estimates, we assume non-performing 
domestic loans to amount to 40% of the total loan volume, i.e. €84 billion. As we assumed 
that the government would not default on its obligations to the private sector, we keep the 
€23 billion claims on government in full.2 But to be on the safe side, we apply the same 40% 
write-off to other credit and assets. The adjusted assets are now transferred into the good 
bank.  
Assuming an equity-to-capital ratio of 13% (as in April 2015), we establish the good bank 
with equity capital in the amount of €32 billion. We are able to transfer the entire €175 billion 
amount of deposits and repo liabilities to the good bank and are still left with €39 billion in 
reserves and other liabilities. Thanks to the elimination of the liabilities to the Bank of 
Greece, we end up with a quite solid good bank (Table A2 in the Appendix). 
The bad bank contains the non-performing domestic loans and other credits and assets of 
lower quality. Against these assets stand the €113 billion liabilities to the Bank of Greece, 
leaving a nominal equity cushion of €36 billion (with a nominal equity-to-capital ratio of 
24%) (Table A3 in the Appendix).  
A raw deal for creditors 
The exercise looks fairly attractive on paper. In effect, it represents the ‘dollarisation’ of the 
Greek economy without the economic resource costs usually associated with such a move.3 
However, it entails a seriously hostile act against the official creditors, in the case of the 
construction of the bad bank especially against the ECB. Depending on the recovery rate of 
the non-performing loans, claims by the Bank of Greece on the bad bank will have to be 
written off. Assuming a recovery rate of, say, 10%, assets of the bad bank could be reduced to 
                                                     
2 As we shall see later, honouring the debt to the private sector is not crucial to our argument. We 
assume this to be the case only as the benefits of default on this part of the debt are smaller than the 
costs. 
3 ‘Dollarisation’ means the replacement of domestic currency by a foreign currency. For a general 
discussion of this issue and the experience of Montenegro, see Nikola Fabris et al., “Economic policy 
in dollarized economies with a special review of Montenegro”, Central Bank of Montenegro, Working 
Paper No. 1, 2004. 
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just €15 billion. As a result, after having wiped out its equity position, the bad bank would 
default on some €62 billion or about half of its liabilities to the Bank of Greece. With the latter 
having equity of just €5.5 billion, the European System of Central Banks would have to bear 
losses in the amount of some €58 billion. These come of course on top of the losses on bonds 
held by the ECB and of euro-area governments that have loaned or guaranteed official loans 
to Greece. 
How to deter Greece from Grexit 
Contrary to general belief, default, Grexit and the reintroduction of the euro as a foreign 
currency would probably be positive for the Greek economy. Confidence could come back as 
private and public excess debt would have been reduced at the expense of foreign creditors. 
The good bank would have a solid balance sheet with which to make new loans. In order to 
avoid the introduction of a new currency for the purpose of funding primary deficits, the 
government would have to achieve primary budget balance. But this has been the objective 
of the new government from the beginning. The good bank would lack a lender of last resort 
in the form of a central bank, but this would not need to be a serious disadvantage. Reserve 
requirements of 100% for sight deposits and a healthy equity cushion to protect longer-dated 
deposits from impairment through credit losses would make a central bank and 
government-backed deposits insurance scheme unnecessary. 
On the other hand, creditors would be hard hit. Not only would they lose their €216 billion 
in financial assistance but they would also have to cover the losses of the ECB caused by the 
default on the Greek bonds in its portfolio (€17 billion) and the claims from the interbank 
payments system Target 2 (€99 billion as of end-April).4 The total loss (before recovery) of 
€332 billion could be a major political liability for many leading policy-makers in the creditor 
countries. It would therefore be rational for them to attach a high cost on a Greek default in 
order to deter, first, the Greeks from walking away from their debt, and second, other 
countries from imitating the Greek strategy.  
One way of raising the costs of default would be to appeal to honesty and fairness. Would 
Greece really want to “bite the hand that fed it” for so long? But moral appeals usually don’t 
go very far in international relations. Another way would be to threaten a cut-off from 
structural funds. However, Greece is set to get only a little more than €3 billion per year until 
the end of this decade. Debt relief is therefore worth 100 years of structural funds (even 
ignoring discounts for future receipts). Finally, the creditors could link the exit from EMU to 
a forced exit from the EU. The costs of leaving the EU and foregoing all privileges of a 
member of the club could be quite high and hence an effective deterrent. Yet, this is not very 
likely as the EU leaders will want to keep Greece in the EU for geopolitical reasons. In the 
event, the only viable strategy for the creditors would seem to be to give Greece the debt 
relief it can easily secure at moderate cost through unilateral default on the official creditors, 
‘Grexit’ and the reintroduction of the euro as a foreign currency. But policy-makers in the 
creditor countries would have to disguise the debt relief from their electorates so as to avoid 
political punishment. 
                                                     
4 See Hans-Werner Sinn, “Die griechische Tragödie“, Ifo-Schnelldienst, 29 May 2015 (Table 1, p. 6) for a 
summary of Greece’s liabilities. Since Greece’s Target liabilities have been caused in part by the 
extension of ELA, losses of the ECB from the default on ELA are included in the losses on Target 
claims. 
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Appendix Tables 
Table A1. Simplified balance sheet of the Greek banking sector (excluding the Bank of Greece, April 
2015, € bn) 
ASSETS   LIABILITIES 
Claims on government 23 Bank of Greece (inc. ELA) 113 
Domestic private loans 211 Deposits and repos 175 
Other credit and assets 161 Reserves and other liab. 55 
Equity 52 
Total 395 Total 395 
Source: Bank of Greece. 
 
Table A2. The ‘good bank’ after eliminating non-performing loans and liabilities to the Bank of Greece 
(€ bn) 
ASSETS   LIABILITIES 
Claims on government 23   
Domestic private loans 127 Deposits and repos 175 
Other credit & assets 97 Reserves and other liab. 39 
Equity 32 
Total 246 246 
 
Table A3. The ‘bad bank’ taking over non-performing loans and liabilities to the Bank of Greece (€ bn) 
ASSETS LIABILITIES 
Bank of Greece (inc. ELA) 113 
Domestic private loans 84 
Other credit & assets 64 
Equity 36 
Total 149 149 
 
